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Valuation Discounting Techniques: 
Terms Gone Awry 
WENDY C. GERZOG* 
A discussion of valuation for transfer tax purposes l almost always begins with 
the estate tax regulation defining fair market value as "the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, nei-
ther being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts."2 Then, the scholar, litigant, or court describes 
equivalent values in money or money's worth. Most of the time, this defini-
tion has been a perfectly good one, but the definition as applied has gotten 
out of control. 
Thus, just as a regulation creates a rule, it should also create exceptions 
to that rule when the terms of the definition are not used in their normal 
sense. Specifically, when the seller is defined as someone who is seeking the 
lowest price for her product, fair market value needs a different definition to 
deal with the distortion created from the misuse of that term. Otherwise, we 
are in the land of Orwellian anti-logic where $100,000 in cash becomes the 
equivalent of $60,000. 
Regulations in the income tax loss context can serve as a model for excep-
tions to a general rule. There are two Regulations that deny losses for inten-
tional destruction of property values.3 They can serve as models for Treasury 
to refine the fair market value definition to conform to a more realistic and 
public policy supported meaning of value when terms in the general definition 
are twisted, muddled, and misapplied. 
*Professor, University of Baltimore, School of Law. I would like to thank all the tax professors 
at the Law and Society meeting in Montreal (May 2008), especially Professors Linda M. Beale, 
Neil H. Buchanan, Jeffrey A. Cooper, Joseph M. Dodge, Jonathan B. Forman, and Brian D. 
Galle, who gave me very helpful comments on this anicle. 
ITransfer taxes include gift, estate, and generation skipping transfer taxes. 1.R.c. Chapters 
11, 12, and 13. 
2Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) ("The 
willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate, 
and gifts taxes themselves, and is not challenged here."); Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, 507 
F.3d 1317, 1321 (lIth Cir. 2007); Estate of True v. Commissioner, 390 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Smith ex rei. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Eyler v. Commissioner, 88 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1996); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 
763 F.2d 891,893 (7th Cir. 1985). 
3Set Reg. § 1.165-3 (denial of loss for propeny acquired with the intention of demoli-
tion); Reg. § 1.165-7 (denial of casualty loss for willful or gross negligence in an automobile 
accident). 
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I. The Fair Market Value Definition 
Courts have interpreted the hypothetical players in the fair market value defi-
nition Regulation to be reasonable individuals who are motivated by economic 
factors.4 That is, "[i) t is well-settled that the willing buyer-willing seller test is 
an objective one, requiring that potential transactions be analyzed from the 
viewpoint of a hypothetical seller whose only goal is to maximize his profit on 
the sale of his interest."5 Moreover, just as courts have held that they "may not 
permit the positing of transactions which are unlikely and plainly contrary to 
the economic interest of a hypothetical buyer,"6 that reasoning should also be 
applied to hypothetical sellers who act contrary to their economic interests.7 
Likewise, that hypothetical standard is defined as incorporating a real sale: 
"[b]y its very definition, this contemplates the consummation of the purchase 
and sale of the property .... "8 
The fair market value standard incorporates a hypothetical seller and buyer 
primarily to promote certainty by applying objective criteria to determine 
valuation.9 Employing hypothetical actors is "supported by the theory that the 
estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of property at death and accordingly 
that the valuation is to be made as of the moment of death .... "10 
While the hypothetical sale is frozen at the valuation date, courts have urged 
that "common sense" be applied to valuation. 11 In Estate of Curry v. United 
'1elke, 507 E3d at 1321 n.ll (citing Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.e. 193,218 (1990)) 
("The buyer and seller are hypothetical, not actual persons, and each is a rational economic 
actor; that is, each seeks to maximize his advantage in the context of the market that exists on 
the valuation date."); Estate ofJameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1983); Estate of Kahn v. Com-
missioner, 125 T.e. 227, 231 (2005). 
5Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483,486 (1 Ith Cir. 1987). 
6Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Estate of Curry, 706 
F.2d at 1428-29. 
7Estate of McClatchy v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998) ("However, 
the 'willing buyer willing seller' method posits not only a hypothetical buyer, but also a hypo-
thetical seller."). 
8Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339, 353 (5th Cir. 2002). 
9Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1988); Propstra 
v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Defining fair market value with 
reference to hypothetical willing-buyers and willing-sellers provides an objective standard by 
which to measure value. The use of an objective standard avoids the uncertainties that would 
otherwise be inherent if valuation methods artempted to account for the likelihood that estates, 
legatees, or heirs would sell their interests together with others who hold undivided interests in 
the property. Executors will not have to make delicate inquiries into the feelings, artitudes, and 
anticipated behavior of those holding undivided interests in the property in question. With-
out an explicit directive from Congress we cannot require executors to make such inquiries.") 
(citation omitted). 
I°Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981). 
IIUnited States v. CartWright, 411 U.S. 546,551 (1973) ("Respondent's argument has the 
dear ring of common sense to it."); seea/so Oettmeier v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 1307, 1314 
(M.D. Ga. 1989) (valuation ofleased timberland). 
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States, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that common sense together 
with the buyer's goal of maximizing her position are reasons that voting and 
non-voting stock in a closely held company should be aggregated for valuation 
purposes under the hypothetical fair market standard in the Regulations. J2 
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit in Estate of Curry refused to consider manipu-
lations in valuation, such as "the hypothetical bifurcation of an otherwise 
integrated bundle of property for valuation purposes," that would distort and 
reduce the decedent's estate tax liability.13 
While a hypothetical buyer would take into consideration partnership form 
limitations created either by the partnership agreement or by local law, a hypo-
thetical seller would not try to discount the value of her assets by transferring 
them to a limited partnership form to minimize the value of her property in 
preparation for a sale to that hypothetical buyer. That is, a seller, who by defi-
nition has a profit motive for her actions, would not create a family limited 
partnership (FLP) with cash, cash equivalents, marketable securities, or other 
liquid assets or some combination because to do so would be to reduce the 
value of her property to a great extent without any, or without any sufficient, 
economic reason. 
One of the main principles of valuation is to value an asset at its "highest 
and best use" rather than at its actual use. 14 Exceptions to this rule are few and 
specifically defined by statute.15 "The fair market value of property is a reflec-
12706 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is well established that the willing buyer-
willing seller rule presumes that the potential transaction is to be analyzed from the viewpoint 
of a hypothetical buyer whose only goal is to maximize his advantage. And it does not comport 
with common sense that a willing buyer would be likely to purchase non-voting shares in a 
small, family-held business, without concomitantly purchasing a controlling voting interest. 
Such a purchase would put the outside purchaser at the mercy of the voting insiders on mat-
ters such as dividend declaration and other important corporate policies, without affording, 
as in the case of most publicly-traded corporate stock, a ready 'exit' remedy of disposing of 
the purchased stock, or the 'voice' remedy of joining with voting non-insiders to protect the 
minority interest. In applying the willing buyer-willing seller rule, courts may not permit the 
positing of transactions which are unlikely and plainly contrary to the economic interest of a 
hypothetical buyer as a basis for the valuation. Thus, even apart from considerations of estate 
tax policy, there is logical reason to reject the estate's proposed separate fair market valuation of 
voting and non-voting stock.") (citation omitted). 
13Id. at 1438. Such behavior, the court stated would encourage "an executor to invent 
elaborate scenarios of disaggregated disposition in order to minimize total value. For example, 
an estate in possession of all shares of a corporation, voting and non-voting, could, under the 
regime urged by the estate here, arbitrarily slice the voting share block so thinly as to deny 
attribution of a control premium to any resulting block." Id. 
14LeFever v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d 778, 782 (lOth Cir. 1996) ("The estate tax under 
section 2001 is generally based on the fair market value of the taxable property, valued at its 
highest and best use.") (citation omirted). 
15For example, section 2032A was enacted to prevent the disappearance of the family farm. 
Estate of Hudgins v. Commissioner, 57 F.3d 1393, 1396-97 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Courts have 
recognized that, in enacting § 2032A, Congress sought to provide relief to those who, when 
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tion of the 'highest and best use' of the property on the date of valuation."16 
That ultimate use is "a reasonable and probable use that supports the highest 
present value as defined as of the effective date of appraisal."17 In Thornton v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court elaborated: 
We agree with petitioners that in determining the value of property on a 
given date a potential highest and best use for the property can be consid-
ered even though the potential use is prohibited on the valuation date by 
some restriction in a deed, statute or roning Regulation .... However, the 
projected highest and best use must have a strong possibility of achievement. 
In other words, it should not be remote, speculative or conjectural. IS 
Since the likelihood of immediate gift giving or dissolving the partnership 
after the decedent's death is great,19 valuing the underlying assets of an FLP 
inheriting family farms, might otherwise be forced to sell them to pay estate taxes calculated 
on 'highest and best use' values, which often exceed significantly the land's value for farming 
purposes. In the hope of avoiding such a result and helping to preserve family farms and other 
closely held businesses, Congress allows qualifYing property to be returned for estate tax pur-
poses at its actual (farm) use value rather than its fair market value based on its highest and best 
use. As permission to elect' this so-called 'special use valuation' constitutes an act of grace or a 
special dispensation by Congress, the courts have strictly construed § 2032A and its require-
ments.") (citations omined); Whalen v. United States, 826 E2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1987). 
16McMurray v. Commissioner, 985 E2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1993); Estate of Juden v. 
Commissioner, 865 E2d 960,963 (8th Cir. 1989). 
17McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 108 (1991). 
1856 T.C.M. (CCH) 395, 1988 T.C.M. (RIA) , 88,479, aff'd in an unpublished opinion, 
908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The court proceeded to explain how it 
would value that interest: "We also agree that in such a case the proper approach is to value 
the property at its highest and best use even though its highest and best use is prohibited at 
the date of valuation by the applicable restriction then to proceed to reduce or discount such 
value by a reasonable estimate of the cost of removing the restriction and for the time needed to 
accomplish such removal." Id. at 41-42. Because the transferor voluntarily imposed restrictions 
of the FLP form, this article would deny a reduction in value to reflect the costs of liquidating 
the partnership. 
190ften immediately after FLP formation, parents begin transferring FLP shares to their chil-
dren as gifts at a discounted value. See, e.g., Martha Brinon Eller, Which Estates Are Afficted by 
the Estate Tax?: An Examination of the Filing Populationfor Year-of Death 2001,25 Stat. Income 
Bull. 185, 192 (Summer 2005), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2893/ 
is_l_25/ai_nI5756730 ("In these family limited partnerships (FLP's), which may hold a variety 
of assets, including common stock, real estate, and cash or cash equivalents, parents typically 
retain only a small general partnership interest and slowly give limited partnership interests to 
their children through lifetime gifts-using the annual exclusion available under the Federal gift 
tax--or bequests. For the parent who is a general partner, the primary goal of this arrangement 
is to reduce the wealth that will eventually be included in his or her estate or the estate of any 
surviving spouse."); ANGELA SCHNEEMAN, THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 80 (3d ed. 2002) ("Most often, the family limited partnership is established 
by individuals who are concerned about protecting their assets and transferring them to their 
children with the least amount of income and estate tax liability .... The parents then gift 
their children with interests in the limited partnership as limited partners."); Larry D. Hause, 
Is a Family Limited Partnership Right For You? (1996), hnp:llwww.fredlaw.comlarticleslrax/ 
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makes the most sense. Thus, just as a decedent cannot give her estate the spe-
cial use valuation benefits of section 2032A,20 by converting real estate into 
farm land that does not satisfy the requirements of that section, a seller who 
creates an FLP should not be able to convert liquid assets into illiquid ones to 
reduce the value of his gifts or of his estate. 
With respect to gift tax valuation, the Fifth Circuit in Citizens Bank 6-
Trust Company v. Commissioner hypothesized that a donor could legitimately 
reduce the value of his gift of artwork by painting a mustache on it.21 The 
court stated, as is currently the state of the law, that 
[t}he same result as in our Mona Lisa case would follow in a case where the 
owners placed restrictions on their stock by agreement and the restrictions 
took effect before a transfer that was subject to gift or estate tax. In both 
types of case the reduction in value would have occurred before the gift was 
made.22 
The court minimized the abuse impact of such a contrivance by contending 
that that kind of estate planning would be costly and, hence, self-limiting.23 
taJc9606_ldh.html ("Through a Family Limited Partnership, parents can begin to shift wealth 
to their children .... The parents are able to give more assets away each year, shifting wealth 
out of the estate."); Donald H. Kelley, David A. Ludtke, and Burnell E. Steinmeyer, Jr., 1 EsT. 
PlAN. FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS § 7:28. Form for Client Explanation of Family Limited 
Partnership (3d ed. 2007) ("When the family transfers assets into the limited partnership these 
assets become the legal property of the Family Limited Partnership. Once the assets are trans-
ferred to the limited partnership, the parents may begin a gifting program to transfer the limited 
partnership interests to their children and grandchildren."). Although the discounts accruing 
to FLPs are due in large part to the fact that a limited partner cannot compel dissolution of 
the partnerships, estate planners typically explain how to get the assets from the FLP after 
the decedent's death. Id. at § 2:45 ("An FLP may have a scheduled termination date or event. 
Families can cancel an FLP at any time before the scheduled termination. However, all partners 
must unanimously consent unless the agreement gives specific partners the right to dissolve the 
partnership. Upon dissolution all of the assets in the FLP will be transferred to the partners' 
direct ownership in proportion to their interests in the partnership, without penalties."). 
20 See Brockman v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d 518, 519 (7th Cir. 1990) ("For the purpose of 
determining federal estate tax, Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code allows heirs to 
family farms to value the assets of the farm in their current use, rather than being required, like 
other heirs, to value the assets at their commercially most lucrative use."). 
21 839 F.2d 1249, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1988) ("This is not to suggest that a donor can never 
gain a tax advantage from acts intended by him to depress the value of the gift. If you own the 
Mona Lisa and paint (indelibly) a mustache on it before giving the painting to your child, with 
the result that its value is greatly reduced, still your gift tax will be computed at the reduced 
value. Maybe that is how Whittemore is to be understood. Or maybe it simply was wrongly 
decided, not because the court should have tried to estimate the probability of the heirs' getting 
together and reassembling their father's control bloc but because the 600 shares should have 
been valued as if sold to a hypothetical buyer, who would pay a premium for control."). 
22!d. at 1255. 
23!d. ("This would make it a more costly method of reducing the market value of the stock 
when and if transferred than would be deferring the restriction until the stock was no longer 
theirs. Hence, as we noted earlier in a different context, it would be a self-limiting tactic; and 
hence it would have less appeal as a method of avoiding taxes."). 
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By contrast, of course, FLPs have proliferated and are extensively marketed24 
because of the much greater estate tax savings such planning, only modestly 
expensive,25 achieves. 26 
More importantly, however, a sane seller would not have intentionally 
placed a mustache on the Mona Lisa. So, ascribing volitional acts to the owner 
of a valuable painting that are contrary to common sense produces the kind 
of illogic and distortion that this article is trying to counter. Additionally, if 
you could remove that mustache to restore the painting to its unmarred value, 
you, as a seller, would do just that. Likewise, a rational seller, or his family, 
will ultimately liquidate the partnership to receive its assets at their highest 
and best value. The mustached Mona Lisa argument is specious and should 
be rejected as such. 
Recently, the Tax Court in Estate of Lee v. Commissione,:z7 refused to give 
effect to the provisions,in decedent's will that defined his wife as a "surviving 
spouse" when she actually died 46 days before him, despite directions in his 
will that this definition be applied.28 The court stated: "[t]he ordinary mean-
ing of the word 'survivor' is one who survives another; ... the term 'surviv-
ing spouse' requires that a spouse actually survive his or her spouse; [that is], 
the later-dying spouse must actually outlive his or her spouse."29 Likewise, a 
24Ronald R. Cresswell, Patrick J. Pacheco, Sarah Patel Pacheco, & Marjorie J. Stephens, 4 
TEX. PRAC. GUIDE WILLS, TRUSTS AND EsT. PLAN. § 13:11 ("Although it appears that some 
planners believe that everyone needs an FLP (much in the same way these same planners believe 
everyone needs an ILIT), not all clients are suitable prospects for an FLP. For example, while 
substantial tax savings may in fact be available, the make-up or total value of the client's assets 
may make an FLP wholly unsuitable."); Eller, supra note 19, at 192 ("Estates [also] reported 
almost $1.7 billion in family limited partnership interests."). In her article, Eller reports, 
"[w]hile family-owned businesses are frequently organized as limited partnerships, for several 
years now, wealth management and estate planning professionals have advocated use of the 
entities as tax shelters for family wealth." Id. 
25Cresswell, supra note 24, at § 13:19 ("What is the smallest estate size necessary for a viable 
FLP? The opinion[slof practitioners vary widely with many focusing solely on the potential tax 
savings versus the relatively de minimis cost of formation and operation in recommending FLP 
planning to relatively 'small' net worth clients. Unfortunately, this thinking ignores important 
aspects of the FLP decision such as ... the costs of defending the FLP in the face of [Service] 
challenge, etc. For example, [Service] audit requests may be highly detailed and very expensive 
for the client, not to mention the cost of defending the FLP in Tax Court or Federal District 
Court? While there [are] no bright line tests, it appears that a client who is unable to contribute 
at least $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 to an FLP ... [should not do] FLP planning."). 
261n re the Appeal of Anderson, No. 313978, 2006 WL 3485542, at *2 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 
20, 2006) ("Here, it is appellants who chose the form of the transactions at issue in order to use 
the FLP's as estate planning vehicles. That form allowed them to take advantage of substantial 
estate and gift tax savings."). 
27No. 14511-06,2007 WL 4463631 (T.e. Dec. 20, 2007). 
281d. at *1, *4 ("While decedent may have intended that Ms. Lee, even though dead, be 
deemed to have survived him, the operation of a will or wills cannot alter the order of the actual 
deaths of decedent and Ms. Lee."). 
291d. at *4. 
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"seller" is someone seeking the highest price for her product; she would inher-
ently not intentionally destroy that value. 
II. A Creature of the Regulations 
The definition of fair market value appears in the estate tax Regulations under 
section 2031 and courts have been reluctant to stray from this venerable, and 
for the most part workable, definition of market value.30 Likewise, although 
legislation has been proposed to thwart valuation discounts,31 there has been 
little progress in this quarter. Congress has enacted very little legislation deal-
ing with transfer taxes; its chief concern at this point appears to center around 
the exemption amount and rates.32 
The hypothetical standard definition of fair market value is a creature of the 
Regulations; however, for valuing different types of property, the regulations 
provide special rules.33 In United States v. Cartwright, the Supreme Court held 
that the valuation rules found in the Regulations were inadequate to deal with 
the valuation of mutual funds that "once issued are not subject to disposition 
3O'fhe government has assened a "substance over form" argument rhat has been consistently 
rejected in coun. See, e.g., Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 84 T.e.M. (CCH) 374, 385, 
2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ,. 2002-246, at 1522, affd, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Respondent 
contends rhat rhe Thompson Pannership and rhe Turner Pannership should be disregarded for 
Federal tax purposes because they lack economic substance and business purpose .... [but rhe 
coun held rhat] rhe partnerships had sufficient substance to be recognized for Federal estate and 
gift tax purposes."); Knight v. Commissioner, I I 5 T.e. 506, 513-15 (2000); Estate of Strangi 
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 485 (2000), aff'd on this issue, rev'd and remanded, 293 F.3d 
279,282 (5rh Cir. 2002); Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.e. 449, 464-65 (1999). 
31See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM 
TAX ExPENDITURES, JCS-02-05 at 2, 396-404 (2005) ("Valuation issues, wherher in rhe context 
of charitable contributions, transfer taxes, or orher situations presented by rhe tax law, are a 
common source of noncompliance. The repon contains several proposals to resolve valuation 
controversies in a simpler and more administrable way."), available at www.house.gov/jct/ 
pubs05.html; STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAX'N, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL, JCS-I-99 at 291 
(1999); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL ExPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL 
YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2000) at 184-85; OMNIBUS BUDGET AND RECONCILIATION 
ACT, H. REp. No. 100-391(II) at 1043 (1987). 
32'fhe Economic Growrh and Tax Relief ReconcUiation Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
50 I, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001) [EGTRRA], repealed rhe estate and generation skipping transfer 
taxes for rhe year 2010; however, under rhe sunset provision, in 2011, rhese taxes will reappear 
as rhey existed before rhe 2001 legislation. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 
38, 150. There have been numerous anempts to abolish rhese transfer taxes permanently, see, 
e.g., H.R. Res. 8, 109rh Congo (2006); H.R. 64, 109rh Cong., 1st Sess. (2005), but rhe more 
recent proposals have focused on rhe exemption amount and rates. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 4235, 
110rh Cong., 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. Res. 4172, 110rh Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 4242, 110rh 
Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 5970, 109rh Cong. (2006). See generally Nonna Noto, CRS Repon 
for Congress, Estate Tax Legislation in the J09th Congress (2006), available at hnp:lldigital. 
library.unt.edulgovdocslcrs/permalinklmeta-crs-7434:1. 
33&e Reg. §§ 20.2031-2 to -9. 
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in a market of 'willing buyers' and 'willing sellers."'34 Because of the lack of 
potential buyers (as shares must be redeemed by the issuing company), the 
court held that mutual funds were most reasonably valued by their redemp-
tion price35 and not the price of the government's Regulation,36 the price in 
the public offering market, or the "asked" price.37 Thus, the court held that 
the general valuation rule was inapplicable here. "Whatever the situations may 
be where it is realistic and appropriate ... to use a standardized retail price to 
measure value for estate tax purposes, it is sufficient to note here that for the 
reasons given, the valuation of mutual fund shares does not present one of 
those situations."38 Treasury revised its Regulations to conform to Cartwright,39 
and it is time for Treasury to carve out another exception to its fair market 
value definition when its terms have lost their natural meaning. 
Treasury could find assistance in the income taX Regulations that specifically 
deny deductions for losses where they stem from the taxpayer's intentional 
destruction of value. Currently, there are two Regulations under section 165 
that deny income tax property loss deductions for the taXpayer's volitional acts 
that diminish her property's value. First, there is a Regulation that denies a loss 
deduction for taxpayers who acquire real estate with the intent to demolish 
existing buildings40 and second, under the casualty loss Regulations, there is a 
prohibition against a deduction for the valuation loss in an automobile acci-
dent where the taxpayer or his agents were grossly negligent or intentionally 
created the casualty.41 
34411 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). According to the court, "'[r]he resulr of this pricing sysrem, ir 
is apparenr, is rhar rhe entire cosr of selling fund shares is generally borne exclusively by the 
purchaser of new shares and nor by the fund itself. In rhis respecr the offering of mutual fund 
shares differs from, say, rhe offering of new shares by a closed-end invesrment company or an 
addirional offering 'ar the marker' of shares of an exchange-lisred securiry, where ar leasr a por-
tion of rhe selling cosr is borne by the company selling the shares.' Privare rrading in murual 
fund shares is vircually nonexisrent. Thus, ar any given time, under the sratutory scheme creared 
by rhe Invesrment Company Acr, shares of any open-end mutual fund with a sales load are 
being sold ar two distincr prices. Initial purchases by the public are made from the fund, ar the 
'asked' price, which includes the load. Bur shareholders 'sell' their shares back ro the fund ar the 
srarutorily defined redemption or bid price." !d. ar 548-49 (cirarions omirred). 
35Id. ar 560 ("[Tlhe only pracrical means of disposing of mutual fund shares once acquired is 
redemption, and redemption cannor be deemed a sale of the sort described in the general rule 
(Reg. §20.2031-1(b», since rhe parry purchasing (the issuing company) is under an absolure 
obligation to redeem the shares when rendered, and the parry selling has no pracrical a1rerna-
rive, if he wishes to liquidare his holdings, other than ro offer them ro the issuing company 
for redemprion."). 
36'fhe court therefore affirmed the appellare court and invalidared Regularion § 20.2031-8(b) 
as an unreasonable regularion.!d. ar 557. 
37Id. ar 551-52. 
38Id. ar 553 n.8. 
39Reg. §§ 20.2031-8(b), 25.2512-6(b) (shares of open-end invesrment company). 
40Reg. § 1.165-3. 
4lReg. § 1.165-7. 
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A. Purchase with Intent to Demolish a Building 
Where business or investment real property is purchased with the inten-
tion of destroying the buildings on the land, no deduction is allowed for 
the demolition and the entire basis must be allocated to the land.42 This 
Regulation applies regardless of whether that plan is "subsequendy deferred or 
abandoned."43 However, a plan formed after purchase to demolish a building 
does not fall within the proscription of this regulation.44 While evidence of 
such an objective is determined under a facts and circumstances test,45 factors 
indicating intent include variable factors such as timing, cost, prohibitions, 
suitability, and lack of income.46 In Wilson v. Commissioner, the Tax Coun 
applied common sense notions about behavior: 
It is hard to imagine why a prudent businessman would purchase the Riz-
zuto property to raise prunes in light of the decline in the prune market and 
the insect infestation problem that existed at that time. On the other hand, 
it is easily understandable why one would purchase the property for real 
estate investment purposesY 
Then, the court proceeded to review all of the factors and arrived at the same 
conclusion to deny the taxpayer his loss deduction.48 
The cited regulation is the current version of an extremely old one, written 
in 1921,49 and reverberates with simplicity and common sense: 
42Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(I}. Basis is adjusted to reflect either the cost of demolition (upward) or 
the net proceeds from the demolition (downward). !d. Before demolition, if used for business 
or income production, some of the basis may be allocated to the building and appropriate 
depreciation allowed. Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(2)(i). 
43Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1). 
44Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1). 
45Reg. § 1.165-3(c)(1). 
46Reg. § l.165-3(c)(2) ("An intention at the time of acquisition to demolish may be suggested 
by: (i) A short delay between the date of acquisition and the date of demolition; (ii) Evidence of 
prohibitive remodeling costs determined at the time of acquisition; (iii) Evidence of municipal 
regulations at the time of acquisition which would prohibit the continued use of the buildings 
for profit purposes; (iv) Unsuitability of the buildings for the taxpayer's trade or business; or (v) 
Inability at the time of acquisition to realize a reasonable income from the buildings."). 
4741 T.C.M. (CCH) 381, 389, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2196. 
48Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 390, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2197-98. ("Again, it 
is impossible to make a determination as to Rietz's intent at the time he acquired the Rizzuto 
property based solely on one or two facts. However, when all the facts are viewed together, 
we find that Rietz intended to remove the prune trees at the time the Rizzuto property was 
purchased."). 
49It was in effect in 1918. Meyer v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D. Mass. 1965) 
("The foregoing regulation is the lineal descendant of the following Treasury regulation, in 
effect in 1918 when it was known as Article 142 (see Treasury Regulations, 1919 edition, page 
45)."). 
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'Art. 142 Voluntary removal of buildings.- * * * 'When a taxpayer buys 
real estate upon which is located a building which he proceeds to raze with 
a view to erecting thereon another building, it will be considered that the 
taxpayer has sustained no deductible loss by reason of the demolition of 
the old building, and no deductible expense on account of the cost of such 
removal, the value of the real estate, exclusive of old improvements, being 
presumably equal to the purchase price of the land and buildings plus the 
cost of removing the useless building.'50 
As the Bender court found, this Regulation, long in effect, has the presump-
tion of correctness. 51 
The reasoning underlying this Regulation is that "if the taxpayer buys the 
land intending to demolish the building, the building can have no value to 
him, and its demolition occasions no loss."52 Likewise, as the Seventh Circuit 
in Landerman v. Commissioner explained, the fundamental theory behind the 
regulation is that "the taxpayer has incurred no actual uncompensated loss."53 
Analogously, where the taxpayer transfers assets to an FLP, it is her expecta-
tion and desire temporarily to discount the value of her assets. Moreover, it is 
not significant that the taxpayer's intention to reduce the value of her estate 
may be a desired consequence that occurs many years after the formation 
of the FLP. With respect to the demolition Regulation, the demolition does 
not need to happen immediately after purchase and, indeed, the Regulation 
further provides that, if prior to demolition, the building is used for business 
or investment purposes, the taxpayer may take deductions pursuant to such 
interim use.54 While the FLP functions as a partnership, and it may be treated 
as such for income tax purposes, when the transferor makes gifts or dies own-
ing the partnership interests, since he intentionally created the FLP to lower 
the value of his assets, that diminution in value attributable to the assets being 
held in partnership form should be ignored. 
Like the creator of an FLP who seeks to reduce his transfer taxes, the tax-
50Bender v. United States, 383 F.2d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 1967) (citing Reg. 45, Art. 142 
(1921». 
51Id. at 661 ("Both the length of time this general administrative interpretation has been in 
effect and the fact that in the intervening yeatS Congress has not amended the Internal Revenue 
Code to alter this interpretation are due some weight."); Meyers, 247 F. Supp. at 943 ("The 
regulations, being based upon a series of prior regulations now almost half a century old, have 
in effect been approved by the silence of Congress. Moreover, the overwhelming weight of 
judicial authoriry supports the proposition that where a taxpayer purchases properry with the 
intention of demolishing either immediately or subsequently the buildings thereon, the cost 
basis of the property so purchased shall be allocated to the land only."). 
S2Ivey v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1970) ("The regulations promulgated 
under the 1939 Code, Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(e)-2 declared the policy that when 'a taxpayer 
buys ... a building, which he proceeds to raze with a view to erecting thereon another building, 
it will be considered that the taxpayer has sustained no deductible loss ... the value of the real 
estate ... being presumably equal to the purchase price of the land."). 
53454 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1971). 
54Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1), -3(a)(2). Su Rev. Rul. 67-445, 1967-2 C.B. 94. 
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payer who destroys a building on his property is not irrational. In the latter 
circumstance, the taxpayer is willing to have an interim loss in value because 
she usually expects to replace the demolished building with a much more valu-
able holding. Sometimes, moreover, the land itself is more valuable without 
the particular building on it. That was the case in Barry v. United StatesY 
The government's expert witness, Mr. Curry, testified that on the date of 
inheritance, as well as on the alternate valuation date, the highest and best 
use of the property was either as vacant land suitable for parking, or suitable 
and available for the construction of a new commercial building. He further 
testified and the trial judge accepted his opinion that the old building was 
a detriment to the overall value of the property. Contrary to the assertion 
of appellants, the other downtown real estate sales investigated and relied 
upon by the government expert as com parables, provided convincing sup-
port, not only for Mr. Curry's valuation of the property as a whole, but for 
his conclusion that the entire value of it lay in the land. 56 
With the FLP, the underlying assets are the more valuable holdings and the 
reason for the temporary FLP form is the taxpayer's expectation of profit, at a 
cost to the federal fisc, through lower transfer taxes. 
In Levinson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ments that the Regulation disallowing demolition losses "is meant to apply 
only in situations where the principal objective of a lease is to obtain the use 
of the land and the demolition occurs in order to accomplish that objective"57 
and not "where the lease and the circumstances of its negotiation have only the 
use of the new building as their principal objective."58 The court underlined 
the distinction between the taxpayer's situation where, "by virtue of the lease, 
[he] acquired a valuable right and the demolition is an essential precondition 
to his realization of the economic benefits therefrom"59 and one in which the 
taxpayer "first demolishes the old building, erects a new building on the same 
site, and then leases the new building."60 In the latter situation, the court 
explained, there was no causal connection between the demolition and the 
lease.61 Likewise, the intentional devaluation of assets occurring by the creation 
of an FLP and the transfer of liquid assets to that entity is "the demolition 
[that] is an essential precondition to his realization of the economic benefits 
therefrom." 
55501 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1974). 
56Id. at 583. 
5759 T.e. 676, 678 (1973). 
58Id. at 679. 
59Id. at 680. 
(/Jld. 
61The COUrt described the distinction: "In the other [situation] such a direct causal relation-
ship between the acquired right and the demolition is lacking, although admirtedly every 
taxpayer who constructs a new building with the intention of leasing it necessarily recognizes 
that any existing building on the same site must be demolished before his objective can be 
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In Wilson v. Commissioner, the rule in the Regulation was extended from 
building demolition to the taxpayer's purchase of land with the intent to 
destroy the prune trees on it.62 Thus, the Regulation has not had a restricted 
application to buildings; there was the same intention to destroy property at 
the time of purchase that merited the disallowance of a loss deduction when 
that property was in fact razed. The facts indicated that the prune market was 
failing, the trees were infested with insects, and there was a new freeway-high-
way interchange that made the land itself attractive to an investor.63 The court 
cited a decision from the 1930s in which apple and pear trees were likewise 
removed as part of the taxpayer's intention at the time of his land purchase; 
in both cases, the taxpayer was denied a loss deduction on the rationale that 
there was no basis in the trees due to his intent to remove them.64 While typi-
cally basis would be allocated both to the land and to the trees, the taxpayer's 
intention at the time of purchase to ignore the trees by removing them after 
purchase provides an exception to the loss rules analogous to the creation of 
an FLP with the intention of devaluing the underlying assets for transfer tax 
valuation purposes. 
Finally, there are some cases where the demolition loss provision applied 
where the taxpayer alternatively argued that he was entitled to a casualty loss. 
However, where the demolition Regulation applies, the taxpayer's basis is zero, 
effectively also denying him a casualty loss deduction that is limited by the 
value of the taxpayer's basis.65 
The Regulation redefines market value based on the purchaser's intention 
to devalue his property. Without knowing the purchaser's intention, there is 
no reason not to apportion the total cost objectively both to the land and to 
the building. Indeed, two purchasers with different objectives would have 
different tax consequences under that loss Regulation. The voluntary removal 
of a building that the purchaser of the property intended from the outset to 
realized. In essence the respondent has simply adapted an old saying by incorporating into his 
regulations a recognition of the fact that a taxpayer with 'a bird in the hand' is in a different 
position than a taxpayer with 'two in the bush.'" Id. 
6241 T.C.M. (CCH) 381, 386, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2194 ("As is evident from 
the above discussion, the regulations under section 165 deal with a situation involving the ques-
tion of whether the taxpayer acquired real property with the intent, at the time of purchase, to 
demolish buildings situated thereon. By analogy, we find these regulations equally applicable to 
this case involving the removal of prune trees from real property acquired by purchase."). 
63Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 382-83, 1980T.C.M. (RIA)! 80,514, at 2189-90. 
6Ii&( Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 386, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2194 (citing Eaton 
v. Commissioner, 1936-239 P-H B.T.A. Memorandum Decisions, aff'd, 95 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 
1938». 
65S((, (.g., Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 390, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2198 ("We 
do not find it necessary to respond to petitioners' arguments that they should be allowed a 
deductible loss for the removal of the prune trees under a casualty loss theory. Since we have 
determined that the prune trees have a zero cost basis, petitioners cannot be said to have 
sustained a deductible loss, under any theory, for the removal of the prune trees."); Reg. § 
1.l65-7(b)(l)(ii). 
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destroy does not result in a loss to him. Likewise, the voluntary devaluation 
caused by the owner of liquid assets by intentionally subjecting them to the 
restrictions of an FLP should not be a diminution recognized by the fair mar-
ket value definition Regulations because, in that instance, he is not acting like 
a seller, who by nature is profit-seeking. 
B. Automobile Damage Due to Taxpayer's Gross Negligence or Intentional Acts 
Where a taxpayer acts willfully such that a probable consequence of his actions 
is damage or destruction of his automobile, he is not entitled to a casualty 
loss deduction for that loss in value. According to the Regulation, automobile 
damage "due to the willful act or willful negligence of the taxpayer or of one 
acting in his behalf" is not deductible.66 While the taxpayer may have legal 
"fault" or liability and may still qualify for a deduction, where she is liable for 
willful or gross negligence, she will be denied a casualty loss deduction.67 
This Regulation68 was promulgated in response to a very early case, Shearer 
v. Anderson, in which the plaintiff was denied a deduction with respect to the 
property damage due to a collision caused by icy road conditions during his 
chauffeur's larcenous use of his automobile.69 The court had to determine 
whether term "other casualty" as used in the stature covered damage from that 
accident. The court allowed the deduction because 
[w]hether the complaint be interpreted as charging the loss to be due 
proximately to the overturning caused by the faulty driving of the chauffeur 
over any icy road, or to subsequent freezing of the motor, in any event, it is 
alleged to be due to a casualty, analogous to a shipwreck, not caused by the 
willful act or neglect of the owner, or of one acting in his behalf.70 
66Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3) provides: "An auromobile owned by the taxpayer, whether used for 
business purposes or maintained for recreation or pleasure, may be the subject of a casualty loss, 
including those losses specifically referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. In addition, 
a casualty loss occurs when an automobile owned by the taxpayer is damaged and when: (i) The 
damage results from the faulty driving of the taxpayer or other person operating the automobile 
but is not due to the Willful act or willful negligence of the taxpayer or of one acting in his behalf or 
(ii) The damage results from the faulty driving of the operator of the vehicle with which the 
automobile of the taxpayer collides." (emphasis added). 
67Parber v. Commissioner, 57 T.e. 714, 718 (1972); White v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 430 
(1967) (deduction for diamond popping from the taxpayer's ring when she closed the car door 
on her hand was allowed as a casualty loss). 
68Reg. § 214, art. 141, 1928-VII-l e.B. 85. This regulation, excluding the taxpayer's "will-
ful act or negligence" was declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 e.B. 310. However, 
"willful act or willful negligence" is used currently in Reg. §1.l65-7(a)(3). 
69'fhe court in Shearer was interpreting section 214a(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, but 
that provision remains unchanged with respect to the use of the term "other casualty." 6 F.2d 
995 (2d Cir. 1927). 
7°Id. at 996-97 (emphasis added). It also might be deductible as a theft loss. 
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Inherently, casualty losses must be unexpected; thus, the destruction of 
property by an arsonist or even an angry person who lawfully destroys an 
expensive lamp (or mars the recipient wall of his home) would not so qualify. 
That was the result in Blackman v. Commissioner where the taxpayer inten-
tionally ignited his wife's clothes and, consequently, burned his house to the 
ground.71 According to the court, his gross negligence barred the deduction.72 
Admittedly, there is an element of public policy in expanding the Regulation 
to cover these facts: "[i]n addition, allowing the petitioner a deduction would 
severely and immediately frustrate the articulated public policy of Maryland 
against arson and burning."73 One might likewise argue that there is a public 
policy argument against allowing a discount for the taxpayer's transfer of liquid 
assets to an FLP because the taxpayer is intentionally devaluing her property 
for transfer tax purposes, distorting what she rightfully owes to the public. 
Thus, courts have held that "[n]eedless to say, the taxpayer may not know-
ingly or willfully sit back and allow himself to be damaged in his property or 
willfully damage· the property himself"74 and still qualify for a casualty loss 
deduction. That is, they have expanded on the duty of the taxpayer to prevent 
a casualty loss as a prerequisite for qualification for the deduction. While the 
Regulation concerns automobile damage as a casualty loss deduction, the 
courts have also looked at the taxpayer's actions in other types of casualties. 
Its application has been consistently broadened so that wherever unexpected, 
accidental force is exerted on property and the taxpayer is powerless to prevent 
application of the force because of the suddenness thereof or some disability, the 
resulting direct or proximate damage causes a loss which is like or similar 
to losses arising from the causes specifically enumerated in section 165(c) 
(3).75 
For example, in Axelrod v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was denied a deduction 
for the sailboat that he raced because he had not proved that it was damaged 
by a casualty,76 He had failed to prove he "did not 'knowingly or willfully sit 
back and allow' his property to be damaged or through his persistent hard 
71 88 T.e. 677 (1987). 
72Id. at 682 ("In our judgment, the petitioner's conduct was grossly negligent, or worse. He 
admitted that he started the flre. He claims that he attempted to extinguish it by putting water 
on it. Yet, the flremen found clothing still on the stove, and there is no evidence to corroborate 
the petitioner's claim that he attempted to dowse the flame. The fact is that the flre spread to 
the entire house, and we have only vague and not very persuasive evidence concerning the 
petitioner's attempt to extinguish the flre. Once a person starts a flre, he has an obligation to 
make extraordinary efforts to be sure that the flre is safely extinguished, and this petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that he made such extraordinary efforts. The house flre was a foreseeable 
consequence of the setting of the clothes [onl flre, and a consequence made more likely if the 
petitioner failed to take adequate precautions to prevent it."). 
73Id. 
74White v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 430, 435 (1967). 
75Id. (emphasis added). 
7656 T.e. 248 (1972). 
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sailing and not turning in as did 38 other boats in fact 'willfully damage the 
property himself.'''77 
With respect to casualty losses, a taxpayer may not deduct a compensated 
loss because to do so would be to give "an unwarranted tax benefit to taxpay-
ers who sustain essentially ephemeral losses .... The allowance of a loss under 
such circumstances would clearly provide a windfall to taxpayers who have 
not sustained an economic loss in any realistic sense."78 With respect to FLPs, 
the discounted value of a taxpayer's assets in limited partnership form should 
be an exception to the general fair market value definition because the only 
economic loss he has sustained is the one he has intentionally desired. 
III. FLPs: Assets, Intent, and Business 
Typically, the creator of an FLP has liquid assets that are converted to illiquid 
ones through the transfer of those assets to the limited partnership form, 
in which there are limitations on marketability. Moreover, gift-giving often 
includes the transfer of minority interests and, after inter vivos gifts, a dece-
dent often holds a minority share in the FLP. Applying the figures from the 
estates of decedents who died in 2001, we can see that FLP assets consist 
primarily of stock (mostly publicly traded securities) and real property, as 
well as bonds, cash assets, and the like.79 The discounted value of using the 
partnership form varies, but ranges 30% to 60%.80 
Case law conforms to this description: an FLP is formed primarily with 
liquid assets and, by using the FLP form and by being assessed as a limited 
partnership interest, the assets become illiquid and devalued. In Estate of Korby 
v. Commissioner, the decedents transferred cash, stocks and bonds to their 
n ld. at 258. At the same time, if the taxpayer takes measures to prevent a casualty, those 
costs are not in themselves casualty losses for which she may take a deduction. Austin v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.e. 1334, 1338 (1980) (the removal oftrees to prevent power line problems or 
house damage did not constitute a casualty loss). The court held they were analogous to other 
section 262 nondeductible personal and living expenses. ld. 
78Axe/rod, 56 T.e. at 2590 (Fay, J., concurring). 
79Eller, supra note 19 at 192 ("By far, the two most prevalent FLP assets were stock and real 
estate. Total stock holdings, including closely held and common stock, or publicly traded stock, 
represented almost a third, 32.9%, of all FLP assets, although publicly traded stock made up the 
largest share, 85.6% ($468.5 million), of stock holdings. Total real estate represented 30.9% of 
FLP assets and included personal residences, improved and unimproved real estate, real estate 
partnerships, and teal estate mutual funds, such as teal estate investment trusts (REIT's). Estates 
reported bonds as the third largest asset category in FLP's. Included in this category, which 
represented 10.9% of all FLP holdings, are bonds of many types, including Federal savings and 
other Federal bonds, corporate, foreign, State, and local bonds, as well as bond funds. While 
10.8% of all FLP assets were either limited partnerships interests or FLP's with undeterminable 
content, the remaining 14.5% of FLP assets were distributed across a handful of asset categories: 
cash assets, such as money market accounts and certificates of deposit; noncorporate business 
assets; mortgages and notes; other assets, including life insurance and retirement assets; and 
mixed mutual funds, which contain a variety of investment instruments."). 
BOld. at 197 ("According to [Service) estate and gift tax attorneys, who review and audit 
Federal estate tax returns, and various private-sector studies of valuation discounting, recent 
discounts ofFLP interests fall between 30% and 60%."). 
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partnerships.81 In Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, the decedent transferred cash 
and marketable securities to her FLp'82 In Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, the 
decedent transferred marketable securities and a note receivable;83 in Estate of 
Thompson v. Commissioner, the decedent did the same.84 In Kimbell v. United 
States, the principal assets transferred to FLP were liquid ones like cash, secu-
rities, and notes although, to a much smaller degree, they included oil and 
gas working and royalty interests.85 In Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, FLP 
assets consisted "primarily of real estate, oil and gas interests, and marketable 
securities."86 In Church v. United States, the majority of assets contributed to 
the FLP were liquid ones: the date of death valuation of the underlying assets 
"was $1,467,748 ... the value of the Ranch accounted for $380,038 [or 
25.89%], and the value of the cash and securities contributed by Mrs. Church 
was $1,087,710 [or 74.11%]."87 In Estate of Hi/lgren v. Commissioner, the 
decedent transferred real estate; 88 in Estate of Abraham v. CommissionerB9 and 
81471 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Korbys transferred to KPLP stocks valued 
at $1,330,442, state and municipal bonds valued at $449,378, and savings bonds valued at 
$71,043, for a total transfer of $1,850,863. In return, the Korbys obtained a 98% limited 
partnership interest from KPLP. In addition, the Korbys' living trust transferred to KPLP a 
savings account worth $37,841, to bring the full funding ofKPLP to $1,888,704. In return, 
the living trust obtained a 2% general partnership interest from KPLP."). 
8291 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, at 1225,2006 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2006-115, at 848 ("On October 
11, 1996, decedent's daughter, acting as attorney-in-fact for decedent and as co-trustee of the 
Lillie Investment Trust, caused $2,404,781 in cash and marketable securities to be transferred 
from the Lillie Investment Trust to the LRFLP as consideration for the Lillie Investment Trust's 
99% limited partnership interest."). 
8383 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, at 1643,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2002-121, at 710 ("(1) Securi-
ties held in a brokerage account at M. L. Stern & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam 
Investments account, (3) securities held in two Franklin Fund accounts, (4) 2,500 shares of 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from Jack P. Marsh."). 
84382 F.3d 367,370 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Decedent contributed $1,286,000 in securities, along 
with notes receivable from Betsy Turner's children totaling $125,000, in exchange for a 95.4% 
limited partnership interest in the Turner Partnership" and there was "minimal post-transfer 
trading." However, after the partnership was formed, the partners contributed additional assets 
including real estate and interests in a real estate partnership.). 
85371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2004). 
8652 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1308, 1987 T.e.M. (RIA) ,87,008, at 41. Respondent claims 
these assets were valued at approximately $60 million on contribution and at decedent's death; 
petitioner claims they should be discounted because the decedent's liquidation rights disap-
peared at his death. Thus, the court adopted the petitioner's argument and valued the assets at 
a discounted $33 million .. 52 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1308, 1987 T.e.M. (RIA) , 87,008, adl. 
872000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369,85 AF.T.R.2d (RIA) 804, 808 (WD. Tex. 2000), aJfd. without 
published opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001). 
8887 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1011, 2004 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2004-046, at 316 ("The seven 
LKHP properties that were contributed to the partnership at its formation included the three 
Orange County properties and the University property that were already the subject of the BLA 
and that were used to fund the amended trust. In addition, the other three properties that were 
contributed were the Crescent Bay, Railroad, and Manzanita properties in California that also 
previously were used to fund the amended trust."). 
89408 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2005), aff'g 87 T.e.M (CCH) 975, 2004 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2004-
039. 
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in Bigelow v. United States,90 the decedents did likewise.91 In Estate o/Schutt 
v. Commissioner, the FLP held Alabama timberlands, marketable securities, 
and cash.92 In Estate 0/ Erickson v. Commissioner, the decedent contributed 
securities and real estate to her FLP'93 In Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 
the decedent transferred securities, real estate, an annuity, two life insurance 
policies, and $400,000 of limited partnership interests for a total partnership 
contribution of approximately $10 million.94 Finally, in Estate of Stone v. Com-
missioner, the FLPs consisted mostly of real property, closely held (the family 
apparel business) preferred stock, and other securities.95 
From case law, stated rationales for forming an FLP include gift giving, 
estate planning, income tax savings, protection of assets from creditors or in 
case of a divorce, increased investment management, and asset protection. 
An FLP achieves the first three objectives by intentionally undervaluing the 
transferor's property. The latter three reasons are often unsupported or belied 
by the facts. Yet, even where there is some basis for those purposes, those goals 
9°503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007). 
91Estate of Abraham, 49 F.3d at 30 ("[C]ommercial real estate p~operties were placed in the 
FLPs.") and Bigelow. 503 F.3d at 960 ("On December 22, 1994, the trust transferred the Padaro 
Lane property, then worth $1,450,000, to the partnership in exchange for 14,500 B units."). 
9289 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1356,2005 T.C.M. (RIA) ,2005-126, at 994. 
9393 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1177, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2007-107, at 759 ("The limited 
partnership agreement provided that Mrs. Erickson would contribute securities plus a Florida 
condominium she owned in exchange for an 86.25% interest in the Partnership. The parties 
stipulated that the fair market value of these assets Mrs. Erickson contributed was approxi-
mately $2.1 million."). 
94417 F.3d 468,473 n.l (5th Cir. 2005), aff'g 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) 
, 2003-145 ("The assets that Strangi transferred to SFLP included, inter alia, (1) brokerage 
accounts at Smith Barney and Merrill-Lynch valued at $7.4 million; (2) an annuity valued at 
$276,000; (3) two life insurance policies valued at a total of $70,000; (4) two houses in Waco; 
(5) a condominium in Dallas; (6) a commercial warehouse in Dallas; and (7) several limited 
partnership interests, valued at approximately $400,000."). 
9586T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 560-61, 2003T.C.M. (RIA), 2003-309. Id. at 1748-49 ("Eugene 
Earle Stone, N, had a particular interest in managing, and maintaining the value of, the pre-
ferred stock of Stones, Inc., and it was decided that approximately $1 million of such stock, as 
well as certain other property, was to be transferred to ES4LP. C. Rivers Stone had a particular 
interest in managing Mr. Stone's Piney Mountain property, and it was decided that various 
parcels of that property totaling 366.097 acres, as well as certain other property, were to be 
transferred to CRSLP. Ms. Morris had a particular interest in managing certain of her parents' 
stock and securities, including at least some of Mr. Stone's preferred stock in Stones, Inc., and 
it was decided that various stock and securities, including approximately $642,000 of such 
preferred stock, as well as certain other property, was to be transferred to RSMLP. Ms. Fraser 
had a particular interest in managing her parents' Cedar Mountain property, and it was decided 
that the 1054.415-acre parcel of that property, as well as certain other property, was to be 
transferred to MSFLP. All of the children had a particular interest in the Cherrydale residence, 
and it was decided that that property, as well as certain other property, was to be transferred to 
ES3LP.") (citations omitted). 
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are insufficient to produce a counterweight for the discounts that ultimately 
are not profit-driven. A hypothetical seller whose goal is to maximize her 
profit would not create an FLP and transfer mostly liquid assets to that entity 
because the primary consequence of creating an FLP is to devalue liquid assets. 
In Citizens Bank 6- Trust, the Seventh Circuit stated that "restrictions imposed 
before transfer are taken into account, provided they are not motivated by a 
desire to avoid gift or estate tax. "96 Since that principal intention is sometimes 
obfuscated by other purported purposes for the creation of an FLP, the focus 
needs to be on the creator's intention to devalue his liquid property, something 
a seller would not do and something Treasury should remedy in its definition 
of fair market value. 
Occasionally, the FLPs state that they were formed to serve the creator's 
donative or estate planning intentions; additionally, the creator often makes 
gifts of FLP interests to her family after she has established her FLP. Facilitat-
ing the transferor's gift giving was named as a primary purpose of the FLPs 
in Thompson,97 Estate ofStrangi,98 Estate of Abraham,99 and, after the forma-
tion of the FLP, the decedent in those cases indeed made family gifts in these 
and other cases.100 In Kimbell, one of the stated purposes was to "establish a 
96839 F.2d at 1252 (emphasis added). 
97Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) ("A financial advisor to 
decedent's family stated the primary advantages of the Fonress Plan included: '(I) lowering the 
taxable value of the estate, (2) maximizing the preservation of assets, (3) reducing income taxes 
by having the corporate general partner provide medical, retirement, and 'income splitting' 
benefits for family members, and (4) facilitating family and charitable giving.'"). 
98Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468,473 (5th Cir. 2005) (Like Thompson, 
Estate of Strang; also used the Fonress Plan. "The Fonress Plan was billed as a means of using 
limited partnerships as a tool for (I) asset preservation, (2) estate planning, (3) income tax 
planning, and (4) charitable giving. Fortress marketed the plan as a means of, among other 
things, 'lowering the taxable value of your estate' by means of 'well established court doctrines 
which recognize that the value of a limited partnership interest is worth less than the value of 
the assets owned by the limited partnership'"). 
99Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The decree provided 
that annual gifts consisting of limited partnership interests in the three FLPs would be made 'in 
amounts not to exceed the then available annual gift tax exclusion for federal gift tax purposes' 
to the three children and their families."). 
100 Thompson, 362 F.3d at 371-72 ("In 1993, the Turner and Thompson Partnerships 
made cash distributions of $40,000 each to decedent which he used to provide holiday 
gifts to family members. Again in 1995, the Thompson and Turner Partnerships made 
cash distributions to decedent of $45,500 and $45,220 respectively. During the same 
time period, decedent made gifts of interests in both partnerships to individual family 
members."); Estate of Abraham, 408 F.3d at 28 ("Between 1995, when the FLPs were set 
up, and 1997, when Mrs. Abraham died, she, through her guardian ad litem, transferred 
percentage interests of her share in the partnerships to her children and their families."); 
Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (In the year after 
the FLP formation, "the Korbys gifted their 98% limited partnership interest in KPLP 
to four irrevocable trusts created for their sons, with each son's trust receiving a 24.5% 
KPLP limited partnership interest. The Korbys Hied gift tax returns in 1995 claiming a 
discount of 43.61% on the book value of each gift because the limited partnership interests 
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method by which annual gifts can be made without fractionalizing Family 
Assets."101 The goals of reducing the decedent's estate and minimizing income 
taxes were stated purposes of all of the Fortress Plan FLPs;lo2 the FLP in Estate 
of Abraham likewise was created to save estate taxes.103 It was also the factual 
purpose in RosenlO4 although the stated purpose was stock trading, financing, 
and "any other purpose allowed by applicable law."105 Similarly, in Erickson, 
the decedent's daughters were clearly motivated to create the FLP for decedent 
for estate planning purposes. I06 In Estate of Schutt, the decedent made yearly 
family gifts of limited partnership interests in amounts qualifying for the 
were minority interests, their transfer was restricted, and they lacked management control. 
Thus, while each gift had a book value of $462,732.48, the gift tax returns reported each gift 
as being wonh $260,935." Id. Moreover, "[b]etween 1995 and 1998-the year both Korbys 
died-KPLP made several distributions to the living trust as general panner, as well as a limited 
number of distributions to the four sons' trUSts as limited partners."); Estate of Bigelow v. Com-
missioner, 503 F.3d 955, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Bigelow reported that decedent had given 
limited partnership interests in Spindrift to her children and grandchildren valued at $61.85 
per unit in 1994 and 1995, $67.79 per unit in 1996, and $61.90 per unit in 1997, applying a 
31 % discount for lack of marketability."). 
IOIKimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2004). 
102SU supra notes 98-99. 
103 Estate of Abraham, 408 F.3d at 29 ("The decree provided for the placing of the three pieces 
of income-producing commercial real estate in FLPs and then apportioning out percentage 
interests in the FLPs to the children in order to reduce the Estate's tax liability upon Mrs. 
Abraham's death."). 
I04Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1223,2006 T.C.M. (RIA) 
, 2006-115, at 846 {"In 1994, decedent's son-in-law attended a seminar on family limited 
partnerships and concluded from this seminar that decedent's assets should be transferred to 
a family limited partnership in order to reduce the value of her estate for Federal estate tax 
purposes .... Feldman [an estate planning anorney] informed decedent's son-in-law (and later 
decedent's daughter) that simply changing the form in which decedent's assets were held from 
a trust to a limited partnership would generate significant tax savings. Feldman believed that 
such tax savings were a major and significant reason to form a limited pannership into which 
decedent's assets would be transferred."). 
I05Estate ofRasm, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1224, 2006T.C.M. (RIA), 2007-107, at 847. 
I06Erickson v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1177, 20007T.C.M. (RIA) ,2007-
107 at 758-59 ("Sigrid admined that she did not understand the paniculars of the rransaction. 
She was aware, however, that a family limited pannership would have estate tax advantages due 
to valuation discounts that apply to the partnership interests .... The credit trUSt did not con-
tribute any of the $1 million in marketable securities it owned to the Partnership. Both Karen 
and Sigrid were aware that there were no estate tax concerns regarding the assets in the credit 
trust unlike the estate tax concerns they had regarding Mrs. Erickson's personal assets. Instead, 
Karen and Sigrid would receive the credit trust assets free of estate tax after Mrs. Erickson's 
death. They thus opted to leave the credit trust securities outside the Pannership."). 
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annual exclusion for gift tax purposes. 107 
Often FLPs are created near the end of an individual's life or at a time of 
illness or incapacity or both, implicitly suggesting an estate planning motive. 
"Estates of decedents 90 and older reported the largest average FLP holdings, 
about $1.4 million per estate .... "108 In Estate of Abraham, the decedent's 
FLP was created when she had Alzheimer's disease.109 Likewise, in Erickson, the 
decedent was 88 years old and had Alzheimer's. I 10 In Korby, Mrs. Korby was 
similarly affiictedl11 and Mr. Korby was 79 years old with heart problems. 112 
In Rosen, the "decedent was 88 years old and in failing health."113 In Harrison, 
the decedent's sons, under his powers of attorney, created an FLP about 6 
months before decedent's death when his health was precarious. 114 In Bigelow, 
the decedent was in her mid-80s, had suffered a debilitating stroke, and had 
moved to an assisted living accommodation when the FLP agreement was 
executed. ll5 In Harper, the decedent was 85 116 and had cancer.ll7 In Hillgren, 
when the FLP was formed, the decedent had been diagnosed with mental 
107Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1356,2005 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 
2005-126, at 1007 (This fact undermines the Tax Court's finding that the decedent's refusal 
to make certain gifts of FLP interests in one year to certain family members was an indication 
of a non-tax motive (emphasis added»; Estate of Schutt, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1365,2005 
T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2005-126, at 1007 ("In 1994, decedent declined to make annual exclusion 
gifts of limited partnership interests in the Schutt Family Limited Partnership to his daughter 
Sarah S. Harrison and her children."). 
J08Eller, supra note 19, at 197 ("Estates of decedents 90 and older reported the largest aver-
age FLP holdings, about $1.4 million per estate, while estates of decedents under 50 reported 
the smallest average FLP holdings, $630,700 per estate. These youngest decedents were still 
accumulating wealth at the time of their deaths and certainly had not begun to consider asset 
divestiture plans, such as the formation ofFLP's and the 'gifting' ofFLP interests."). 
I09Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2005). 
II°Erickson, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175,1177, 2007T.C.M. (RIA)! 2007-107, at 758 ("Mrs. 
Erickson's doctor confirmed a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease on March 5, 1999, when Mrs. 
Erickson was 86 years old. Mrs. Erickson's Alzheimer's disease continued to progress. By May 
2000, Mrs. Erickson no longer drove or cooked."). The FLP agreement was signed in 2001. 
Id. 
II I Korby v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 848,850 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Edna Korby began living 
in a nursing home in Pelican Lake, Minnesota, in February 1993 when she was diagnosed with 
severe Alzheimer's dementia. She lived there until she died on July 3, 1998."). 
I12Korby, 89T.C.M. (CCH) 1142,2005 T.C.M. (RIA)! 2005-102. 
I13Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220,2006 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2006-115. 
114Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1307, T.C.M. (P-H) 
! 87,008, at 41 (1987). 
I15Bigelow v. United States, 503 F.3d 955, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2007). 
116Harper v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121. 
117 Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 708. ("Dece-
dent was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1983 and with cancer of the rectum in 1989."). 
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illness and had tried to commit suicide. I IS In Thompson, the decedent was 
93 when the FLP was formed. 1I9 In Kimbell the decedent was 96 when, two 
months before her death, she created her FLP with a term of forty years.120 In 
Strangi, " [a]s foiling health began to telegraph that the inevitable would occur, 
Albert Strangi transferred approximately ten million dollars worth of personal 
assets into a family limited partnership."121 Finally, in Church, two days before 
she died, the decedent created an FLP'122 
In Harper, the primary purpose of forming the FLP, as stated in the agree-
ment, was investment managementl23 although according to the estate, the 
FLP was mainly organized for "the business purpose of protecting from Lynn's 
creditors the assets that Lynn would receive or inherit from decedent. "124 While 
it was true that decedent's daughter Lynn had creditors in connection with 
litigation over her condominium,125 decedent was 85 with metastatic cancers 
and hospitalized at the time he transferred 60% of his FLP to his two children 
and funded his FLP with trust assets. 126 The court emphasized the testamen-
tary nature of the transactions and the decedent's desire to use the partner-
ship for estate planning purposes.127 Underlining those intentions, the court 
concluded that the decedent "wanted to protect what Lynn would receive 
from him, not what she currently possessed."12S In Hillgren, the principal stated 
purpose was asset protection although the management of the assets remained 
J18HiIlgren v. Commissioner, 87 T.e.M. (CCH) 1008, 1009,2004 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2004-
046, at 313. Within a year, the decedent had a second, this time successful, suicide attempt. 
Id. 
J19'fhompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 370-72 (3d Cir. 2004). 
12°Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated 
and remanded by 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The Partnership is for a term of 40 years (i.e., 
until Decedent would have been 136 years old)."). 
'2lStrangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
I22Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ! 60,369, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 804 (WD. Tex. 
2000). 
123Harper v. Commissioner, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) 1641,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-12l. 
124Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1646,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 714 (emphasis 
added). 
125Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1642,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 708. 
126Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1644,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 711-12. 
I27Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1650-52,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 719-21 
("While we acknowledge that HFLP did come into existence prior to decedent's death and that 
some change ensued in the formal relationship of those involved to the assets, we are satisfied 
that any practical effect during decedent's life was minimal. Rather, the partnership served pri-
marily as an alternate vehicle through which decedent would provide for his children at his death 
.... Hence, not only the objective evidence concerning HFLP's history but also the subjec-
tive motivation underlying the entity's creation suppon an inference that the arrangement was 
primarily testamentary in nature .... The fact that the contributed propeny constituted the 
majority of decedent's assets, including nearly all of his investments, is also not at odds with 
what one would expect to be the prime concern of an estate plan. We additionally take note of 
decedent's advanced age, serious health conditions, and experience as an anorney."). 
128Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1652,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 722 (emphasis 
added). 
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the same129 and decedent and Hillgren conducted partnership business with-
out even revealing the FLP's existence. 130 Likewise, in Estate of Rosen, Strangi, 
and Estate of Bigelow, there was little change in the relationship between each 
decedent and his or her assets. 131 Additionally, in Bigelow, while the stated 
purpose of the FLP was to own and operate residential real estate, decedent's 
only residence, not only did nobody respect the entity's formalities, but also 
the only actual purpose for the transfer was to reduce the value of decedent's 
gifts, which the children, under a power of attorney, made to themselves on 
decedent's behalf 132 
In Kimbell, protection from potential creditors of their oil and gas 
interests133 or property division in the instance of a divorce,l34 and asset 
129Hillgren v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1013,2004 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2004-
046, at 319-20 ("In response to questions that were posed by Goldenberg regarding LKHP, 
Hillgren explained the purpose of forming the partnership as 'Lea suffered from depression. 
She did not have a husband. She was dating a young guy. He was worried about his motives 
and she was worried too. The Partnership served as an asset protection.' Hillgren gave the 
same answer in response to questions as to why they formed the partnership when Hillgren 
was already managing decedent's properties under the BLA. Hillgren also stated that his rights 
under the BLA were senior to the partnership agreement and that he gave his consent for the 
transfer of the properties to LKHP'"). 
13Wilgren, 87T.C.M. (CCH) at 1012, 2004 T.C.M. (RIA), 2004-046, at 317 ("The part-
nership was designed generally to be invisible to the public and to persons with whom decedent 
and Hillgren did business."). 
131Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1225, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA) 
,2006-115, at 848 ("After the transfer, there was no material change in the manner in which 
the transferred assets were managed."); Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 481-82 (5th 
Cir. 1005) ("In short, although Strangi may have transferred a substantial percentage of assets 
that might have been actively managed under SFLp, the Tax Court concluded, based on sub-
stantial evidence, that no such management ever took place. From this, the Tax Court fairly 
inferred that active management was objectively unlikely as of the date of SFLP's creation. As 
such, we cannot say that the Tax Court clearly erred in rejecting the Estate's 'active manage-
ment' rationale." (emphasis in original text»; Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner, 503 F.3d 955, 
972 (9th Cir. 2007) (,,[Tlhe Padaro Lane property was Spindrift's sole asset, required no active 
management, and was the partnership's only business."). 
132Estate o/Bigelow, 504 F.3d at 961-62 ("Bigelow reported that decedent had given limited 
partnership interests in Spindrift to her children and grandchildren valued at $61.85 per unit 
in 1994 and 1995, $67.79 per unit in 1996, and $61.90 per unit in 1997, applying a 31% 
discount for lack of marketability."). In addition, the estate argued that her FLP "enhanced the 
ease of gifting interests to decedent's children and grandchildren." to which the court explained, 
"[f]irst, gift giving is considered a testamentary purpose and cannot be justified as a legitimate, 
non-tax business justification." !d. at 972. 
133Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257,268 ("Specifically, a living trust did not provide 
legal protection from creditors as a limited partnership would. That protection was viewed as 
essential by Mr. Elyea and Mrs. Kimbell because she was investing as a working interest owner 
in oil and gas properties and could be personally liable for any environmental issues that arose 
in the operation of those properties. Mr. Elyea also stated that Mrs. Kimbell wanted the oil 
and gas operations to continue beyond her lifetime and they felt that by purring the assets in 
a limited partnership, they could keep the pool of capital together in one entity that would be 
enhanced over time"). 
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management135 were the stated and, according to the circuit court, the 
documented rationales for the FLp' I 36 Yet, decedent was 96 years old, the 
assets transferred to his FLP were mainly liquid ones, and management 
remained essentially the same. In Stone, the Tax Court found that the dece-
dents' prime motivations for the FLP's formation were their "investment 
and business [management] concerns"137 and their desire "to resolve the 
children's concerns [and disputes] regarding Mr. Stone's and Ms. Stone's 
assets."138 However, the children mainly argued over their inheritance 
of assets from their parents,139 again indicating decedent's testamentary 
intent.140 Likewise, in Estate of Abraham, one reason to create the dece-
dent's FLP was to end litigation among the decedent's children, 141 but the 
resolution consisted of court sanctioned gift-giving and estate planning. 142 
134Id. ("Mrs. Kimbell wanted to keep the asset in an entity that would preserve the property 
as separate property of her descendants. The family had faced that issue during the divorce of 
one of Mrs. Kimbell's grandsons."). 
135 Id. ("Keeping the assets in one pool, under one management would reduce administrative 
costs by keeping all accounting functions together. The partnership would also avoid costs 
of recording transfers of oil and gas properties as the property was passed from generation to 
generation .... The partnership also served the purpose of setting up the management of the 
assets if something should happen to her son, which was a concern as he had experienced some 
heart problems and had undergone a serious surgery."). 
131i/d. at 260. Other stated purposes in Kimbell were to: "facilitate the administration and 
reduce the cost associated with the disability or probate of the estate of Family members; pro-
mote the Family's knowledge of and communication about Family Assets; provide resolution 
of any disputes which may arise among the Family in order to preserve Family harmony and 
avoid the expense and problems of litigation; and consolidate fractional interests in Family 
Assets." Id. 
I37Stone v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 553, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2003-309, at 
1737, n.74 ("At least as early as the last six months of 1995, Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone were in 
control of their respective assets. However, they no longer were interested or actively involved 
in managing those assets and wanted their children to become actively involved in the manage-
ment of those assets."). 
138Stone, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 557, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2003-309, at 1744 ("Another very 
imponant reason why the Stone family desired to explore the use of family limited partnerships 
was to sertle and bring an end to the litigation among the children. Finally, the Stone family also 
wanted to explore the use of family limited partnerships as a way to help avoid disputes among 
the children regarding the ultimate division of their parents' respective assets afrer their parents 
died, although that was not the primary reason for the Stone family's interest in exploring the 
use of such types of pannerships."). 
139Stone, 86T.C.M. (CCH) at 557, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA)! 2003-309, at 1743 ("The primary 
reason why the Stone family became very interested in exploring the use of family limited part-
nerships was to resolve the children's concerns regarding Mr. Stone's and Ms. Stone's assets."). 
1400f course, a sure-fire way to find solidarity among squabbling relatives is to show them 
that they will all fare bener at their parents' deaths and at the government's expense. 
141See Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 29 (lst Cir. 2005) ("Litigation and 
discord among the children, mainly berween Richard and the rwo sisters, continued. The feud 
was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. Abraham's protection. The litigation 
was also draining Mrs. Abraham's assets."). 
142Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 975, 976, 2004 T.C.M. (RIA) 
! 2004-039, at 264 ("The reason for the gifring powers was, inter alia, that decedent's estate 
'is likely to be subject at her death to * * * taXes at the highest marginal tax rates then in 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, NO.3 
798 SEcrION OF TAXATION 
In Church, the stated purpose of the limited partnership was "to consolidate 
their undivided interests in a family ranch ... for centralized management 
... and preserve the Ranch as an on-going enterprise for future generations" 
as well as to protect her "assets from judgment creditors in the event of a 
catastrophic tort claim against her."143 Yet, the ranch was a relatively minor 
asset of the partnership in contrast to the overwhelming liquid assets in the 
FLP, decedent died two days after her FLP was created, there was no evidence 
of any history of tort claims, and it was clear that decedent's family was con-
cerned about estate planning. l44 Finally, in Estate of Korby, the estate contended 
that the FLPs were created for creditor protection for their business and in 
the event of a divorce,145 but the court held that the estate had not proved its 
claim146 and had made the transfer for estate planning purposes. 147 
Besides adherence to the formalities of an FLP, how much business must 
be conducted by the FLP? A review of case law under section 2036148 shows 
that very little, if any, business must be conducted by the FLP to qualify under 
effect' .... On June 13, 1994, decedent's children, their respective counsel, as well as dece-
dent's legal guardians and representatives agreed to a stipulation and agreement for entry of 
decree to petition to establish an estate plan for decedent (the decree) regarding decedent's 
guardianship."}. 
143Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369,84,776-77,85 A.ET.R.2d 804, 805 
(W.D. Tex. 2000). 
144Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. , 60,369, at 84,778, 85 A.ET.R.2d at 807 ("I find that the 
Primary purpose of the partners in forming the Partnership was a desire to preserve the family 
ranching enterprise for themselves and their descendants."). However, the court found that 
"the Partnership was not formed solely to reduce estate taxes." Id. 2000-1 U.S.T.e. , 60,369, 
at 84,778, 85 A.ET.R.2d at 808. 
145Estate ofKorbyv. Commissioner, 89 T.e.M. (CCH) 1142, 1148,2005 T.e.M. (RIA), 
2005-102 at 705 ("The estate argues that the creation of KPLP was bona fide because Austin 
and Edna created KPLP to protect the family from commercial and personal injury liability 
resulting from their bridge-building business, as well as liability arising from divorce."). 
146Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, 471 E3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The tax court also 
rejected the Korbys' claim KPLP was created to protect the family from commercial and per-
sonal injury liability arising from their bridge-building business, as well as liability from divorce, 
stating 'the estate has not shown that the terms of the KPLP agreement would prevent a creditor 
of a partner from obtaining that parmer's KPLP interest in an involuntary transfer."). 
1471n Estate of Korby, the circuit court upheld as not erroneous that ''Austin and Edna formed 
KPLP in order to make a testamentary transfer of their assets to their sons at a discounted value 
while still having access to the income from those assets for their lifetime." Id Moreover, the 
court held that the FLPs were created to pay for the Korbys' personal, living expenses. Id. at 
850 ("KPLP made payments to the Korbys' living trust totaling $120,795 ($30,387 in 1995, 
$19,334 in 1996, $32,324 in 1997, and $38,750 in 1998)}. The Korbys used these payments 
to help defray Edna's nursing home costs of over $30,000 per year and pay the couple's taxes, 
medical bills, and other expenses." Id (foomote omitted). 
148I.Re. § 2036 provides for the inclusion of the value of the transferred property, in this 
instance the underlying assets in an FLP, where the transferor retains, for his life, for any period 
not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period that does not end before his 
death, present enjoyment of or income from the property where the transfer was not a bona 
fide sale for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 
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the bona fide sales exception of that statute. In Estate of Harrison,149 the court 
continually emphasized weaknesses in the government's case. 150 The Estate 
of Bongard v. Commissioner court commented that in Estate of Harrison, "[s] 
orne of the assets the decedent contributed included oil and gas assets, which 
required active management" I 51 and emphasized the family's successfully 
operated family business, but the extent of the FLP's active business activities 
was not explained by the court; indeed, the court's business requirement had 
a very low threshold. 152 In Church, the decedent's children managed the land, 
which was leased for grazing and hunting as well as for oil and gas interests. 
The court held that the "character" of the majority of ownership interests 
"changed dramatically" after the FLP formation. 153 The liquid assets that 
149Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1987 T.e.M. (P-H) , 
87,008. With respect to the decedent's moment of death lapsing liquidation right, Estate of 
Harrison was criticized and legislatively reversed by the enactment of section 2704. See Joseph 
M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of 
the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REv. 421,489, n.315 (2001); Martin D. 
Begleiter, Estate Pumning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth, Chapter 14: Jason Goes to Wash-
ington -- Part 1,81 Ky. L.J. 535, 545 n.67 (1993); D. John Thornton and Gregory A. By ton, 
Valuation of Family Limited Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 345, 374 (1996) ("Section 
2704 was enacted to correct certain perceived valuations abuses associated with lapsing rights 
as illustrated in Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, and artificial liquidations restrictions under 
the control of family members."); Travis L. Bowen and Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use 
in Tax, Estate and Business Planning, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 305, 336 (1996). 
15°Estate of Harrison, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1309, 1987 T.e.M. (P-H) , 87,008 ("With 
respect to business purpose, petitioner presented convincing proof that the partnership was 
created as a means of providing necessary and proper management of decedent's properties 
and that the partnership was advantageous to and in the b"est interests of decedent. Respondent 
presented no proof to rebut petitioner's showing." (emphasis added». Further, the court refused to 
find that the FLP was created for testamentary purposes because (1) all of the partners' liqui-
dation rights were restricted; (2) decedent was adequately compensated for the transfer of his 
assets to the partnership; and (3) "there is no proofin the record that the partnership was created 
other than for business purposes." !d. (emphasis added). 
151Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.e. 95, 114 (2005). 
152Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1309, T.e.M. (P-H) 
,87,008, at 42-3 (1987). ("[The FLP] agreement will be ignored only if there is no business 
purpose for the creation of the partnership or if the agreement is merely a substitute for testa-
mentary disposition. With respect to business purpose, petitioner presented convincing ptoof 
that the partnership was created as a means of providing necessary and proper management 
of decedent's properties and that the partnership was advantageous to and in the best interests 
of decedent. Respondent presented no proof to rebut petitioner's showing." (emphasis added) 
(citations omined». 
153Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369, 84,779, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 804, 807 
(WD. Tex. 2000). ("The Government contends that while the formation of the Partnership 
took the form of a bona fide business transaction, the transaction had no substance and was 
entered into for no purpose other than to reduce the taxation of Mrs. Church's estate. I do not 
find this to be the case. The character of the interests owning a majority of the Ranch changed 
dramatically as a result of the Partnership. Prior to its formation, Plaintiffs and their descen-
dants would have owned undivided interests in the Ranch, with each interest carrying the right 
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comprised the vast majority of assets transferred to the FLP were explained, 
satisfactorily to the court, as necessary to restore lost income from an expired 
grazing lease.J 54 But, the taxpayer created the FLP only two days before her 
death and although the court held that her death from cardiopulmonary col-
lapse was unanticipated, she had been suffering from breast cancer. 155 Accord-
ing to the Tax Court in Estate o/Stone, all of the five FLPs functioned "as joint 
enterprises for profit" in which the children provided active management, but 
most of the family squabbling was over the children's expected inheritance of 
their parents' assets. 156 Moreover, in Estate 0/ Schutt, besides gifts and other 
estate planning, the Tax Court found as a sufficient non-tax motive that the 
decedent wanted to ensure that certain stock would be held and not sold. 157 
However, although that may be a non-tax motive, it is not evidence of any 
business or even any profit-seeking motive that is integral to being a seller. 
Finally, in Kimbell, the FLP's oil and gas interests constituted a mere 11 % 
of its assets. 158 ''At formation, $438,000 of approximately $2.5 million in 
assets were oil and gas properties."159 On the other hand, in Kimbell the vast 
to use and enjoy the property, or force a partition or possible sale. The Partnership eliminated 
these individual rights and placed ownership of a majority of the Ranch in a Partnership that 
was not controlled by any single person."). 
154Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C ,60,369, at 84,777, 85 A.F.T.R2d at 806 (WD. Tex. 2000) 
("The Partnership was also formed with an eye towards the possibility of actively engaging in 
raising cattle. The Ranch was in the midst of a prolonged and continuing drought. The grazing 
lease expired in 1994, and there was a question whether it would be renewed. The Partnership 
was prepared, if necessary, to replace this lost income through active operations. Working capital 
over and above income from the Ranch would have been necessary to engage in this activity" 
(citations omitted». 
155Her breast cancer was in remission for the six months prior to her death and while the 
court held that she was not making a testamentaty transfer, her medical history might have 
suggested otherwise. !d. 
156Estate of Stone v. Commissioner, 86 T.CM. (CCH) 551, 580, 2003 T.CM. (RIA) 
, 2003-309, at 1776. 
157Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.CM. (CCH) 1353, 1357, 2005 T.CM. (RIA) 
, 2005-126, at 989 ("Among the considerations providing an impetus for this potential restruc-
turing of decedent's assets, Mr. Sweeney and/or Mr. Dinneen recall discussing: (1) Decedent's 
concerns regarding sales by family members of core stockholdings and his desire to extend and 
perpetuate his buy and hold investment philosophy over family assets; (2) the need to develop 
another vehicle through which decedent could continue to make annual exclusion gifts due 
to exhaustion of available units in the family limited partnership for this purpose; and (3) the 
possibility of valuation discounts."). 
158Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2001) ("At inception, approxi-
mately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11 %) and royalty (4%) 
interests."); Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C 95, 119 (2005) (The oil and gas 
properties in Kimbell related to a business created by Mr. Kimbell, decedent's late husband, in 
the 1920's.). 
159 Kimbl!ll, 371 F.3d at 267 (Most (71 %) of the oil and gas interests were "working interests" 
as opposed to passive royalty interests.). 
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majority of interests were liquid: cash, notes, and securities and her son had 
performed the same management expertise for the trust assets before their 
transfer to her FLp'I60 Certainly, linle change in management pre- and post-
transfer of assets to an FLP undermines any real expectation of a huge growth 
potential to recoup the large devaluation due to the change to a limited part-
nership form. The circuit court in Kimbell considered the other assets neces-
sary for maintaining the oil and gas business.161 Yet, if indeed the relatively 
small business activity required so much liquid assets, one must still question 
the profit intention of devaluing such a large percentage of liquid assets and 
of retaining the same management personnel with the same duties. With so 
much marketable securities, notes, and cash and so little business, with FLP 
discounts in Kimbell amounting to roughly 50%,162 how can the post-transfer 
values increase beyond the discounted value caused by the illiquid FLP form? 
Inevitably, one must wonder whether any seller (without depletion motives)163 
would create an FLP primarily with liquid assets and question the policy rea-
son for allowing such a large tax benefit for intentionally devaluing property. 
How can $2.5 million that is devalued to $1.25 million be doubled by other 
FLP considerations so that the decedent's estate is not depleted? 
Beginning with definitions from the gift tax Regulations, a transfer for 
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth is defined as 
including a "transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a 
transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative 
intent)."I64 Therefore, that definition includes the requirement that there be 
I60Id. at 268. 
161Id. at 259,267 ("Nonoperating working interest owners are called upon to pay their share 
of operating expenses and to make elections whether to participate in drilling operations or 
various phases thereoE"). In Kimbel~ the Fifth Circuit concludes: 
The business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted, non-
managerial interest in a limited partnership involves financial considerations other 
than the purchaser's ability to turn right around and sell the newly acquired limited 
partnership interest for 100 cents on the dollar. Investors who acquire such interests 
do so with the expectation of realizing benefits such as management expertise, 
security and preservation of assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of personal 
liability. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that 
the investor's dollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for 
adequate and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus acquired 
has a present fair market value, i.e., immediate sale potential, of substantially less than 
the dollars just paid a classic informed trade-off. 
Id. at 266. 
I62Id. at 265 ("[T]he value of Mrs. Kimbell's interest in the Partnership is worth only 50% of 
the assets she transferred (as discounted for lack of control and marketability)"). 
163Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004). As the Kimbell court also 
stated, "[I)n order for the sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the exchange of assets 
for partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the transfer does not deplete the estate." 
Id. 
I64Reg. § 25.2512-8. 
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a functioning business (hence, "in the ordinary course of business") and that 
the transfer be "bona fide, at arm's length," and lack any gift-giving motive. 
The transfer of assets to an FLP for gift or estate purposes is not likely to 
satisfy that last criterion since such transfers are precisely made with a dona-
tive purpose. 165 What does "in the ordinary course of a business" mean? The 
Regulations should require that the primary intention of creating an FLP and 
transferring the decedent's assets to the FLP is consistent with a profit-motive. 
If the FLP funds are used to pay the transferor's personal and living expenses, 
the transferor's intent clearly lacks a profit-motive. If the transferred assets 
consist primarily of a combination of cash, cash equivalents, or marketable 
securities, the transferor's intent should be presumed to be lacking a profit-
motive to FLP formation. Business or investment profit-motive does not 
include gift giving, bequests, or estate planning. Rather, intentions of gift-
giving and estate valuation reduction in creating an FLP indicate an intention 
to devalue the transferor's assets. Protection from creditors as a purpose not 
only requires a history of litigation or other substantiated need for such pro-
tection but also needs to exist within the context of a profit making activity 
and not to protect personal or family assets when the FLP assets are devalued 
by discounts. Solidification of management as a motive requires· significant 
post-FLP formation changes in investment to show how the business intended 
to recover the devaluation of FLP assets. 
The Tax Court's current requirement of a non-tax motive is inadequate. 166 
Its Bongard test requires "the existence of a legitimate and significant nontax 
reason for creating the family limited partnership, and [that] the transferors 
received partnership interests proportionate to the value of the property trans-
ferred."167 In Estate of Bongard, the court described factors that indicated the 
165Reg. § 25.2512-8. The regulation also states that "[aJ consideration not reducible to a value 
in money or money's worth, as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly 
disregarded, and the entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gifr." 
Id. As most gifts and bequests are made because of the transferor's "love and affection," these 
are clearly not business reasons for the FLP creation. !d. 
I66SU generally Wendy e. Gerzog, Bongard's Nontax Motive Test: Not Open and Schutt, 107 
TAX NOTES 1711 (2005). The Bongard test is used to determine whether or not the "bona fide 
sale for adequate and full consideration" exception under section 2036 applies. With respect to 
the decedent's FLP in Bongard, the coure held there was only a testamentary, and no nontax, 
motive for its formation. Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.e. 95, 125-26 (2005) 
("At trial, Mr. Fullmer testified that BFLP was established to provide another layer of credit 
protection for decedent. Additionally, the estate assertS that BFLP facilitated decedent's and 
Cynthia Bongard's postmarital agreement. Messrs. Bernards and Fullmer both also testified that 
BFLP was established, in pan, to make gifts. On December 10, 1997, decedent made a gift of 
a 7.72% ownership interest in BFLP to Cynthia Bongard. This gift was the sole transfer of a 
BFLP pannership interest by decedent during his life. BFLP also never diversified its assets dur-
ing decedent's life, never had an investment plan, and never functioned as a business enterprise 
or otherwise engaged in any meaningful economic activity."). 
167 Estate of Bongard, 124 T.e. at 118. 
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lack of a nontax purpose: (1) the taXpayer stands on both sides of the transac-
tion; (2) the taxpayer needs partnership distributions for his maintenance and 
support; (3) the partners commingle partnership assets with their own; and 
(4) the taxpayer does not transfer the property to the FLp'168 
The non-tax motive test does not require a profit-making intent and its 
threshold is too low to identifY the transferor with a hypothetical seller in the 
general fair market value definition sense. Indeed, the insufficiency of that 
test is readily apparent in the flawed Estate of Schutt decision, and even more 
marked in the recent Mirowski decision. 169 In Estate of Schutt, the Tax Court 
found that the FLPs were established in order to create an entity to buy and 
hold DuPont and Exxon stock, consistent with the decedent's investment 
philosophy and that the FLPs were intended to provide centralized manage-
ment and prevent unwise sales of the decedent's family's stock holdings. 17o 
Discussing the non-tax motive factors the court listed the following facts: 
There was an actual transfer of the property to the FLPs, there was no com-
mingling of assets, the decedent had retained sufficient assets for his support 
and the maintenance of his lifestyle, and the decedent was not on both sides 
of the transaction. The Estate of Schutt court explained that there was suffi-
cient evidence of "give-and-take" and that the trust's representatives were very 
involved in the process. "Such a scenario bears the earmarks of considered 
negotiations, not blind accommodation." 171 In Mirowski, decedent controlled 
the formation and terms of the family LLC and the LLC paid her gift and 
estate tax liabilities. The only nontax motive in that case was decedent's goal 
of family cohesiveness, a purpose common to all FLPs and family LLCs. How 
are these findings indicative of a profit-motive sufficient to find equivalence in 
value between the transferred assets and their discounted value in FLP form? 
Iv. A Working Prototype 
The proposed Regulation should resemble the demolition loss and automo-
bile casualty loss Regulations. The following is a working prototype of a new 
Regulation (section 20.2031-1(c)) to be added as urged in this article: 
§ 20.2031-1(c) Definitions in general. (1) The terms "buyer" and "seller" 
are to be used in their normal, customary sense. A buyer is one who is seeking 
to pay the lowest price for property and a seller is one who is seeking to sell 
property at its highest price. 
168Id. at 118-19. 
169Estate of Murowski v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2008-74; see Wendy e. Gerzog, "Tax 
Court FLP Confusion: Mirowski," 120 TAX NOTES 263 OuI. 21, 2008). 
17°According to the Tax Court, the FLPs in fact served those aims and both the documentary 
and testimonial evidence evinced the decedent's concern over investment control. Estate of 
Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.e.M. 1353, 1367,2005 T.e.M. (RIA) ~ 2005-126, at 1010. 
171Estate of Schutt, 89 T.e.M. at 1367,2005 T.e.M. (RIA) ~ 2005-126, at 1011. 
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(2) Except as provided in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, when a trans-
feror has intentionally devalued his property, he is not entitled to have the 
definition of fair market value in § 20.2031-I(b) applied for v;uuation pur-
poses on the devalued asset. Rather, valuation under that section must be 
determined without regard to the volitional acts of valuation depression. This 
rule does not apply to the transferor's acts of negligence or gross negligence. 
(3) If the transferor is engaged in a trade or business, subparagraph (2) shall 
not be applied to property used in that trade or business. If devaluation occurs 
when trade or business property is transferred, that transfer must be "bona 
fide, at arm's length," and lack "any donative intent." 
(4) Evidence of intention. 
(i) An intention to devalue property is presumed to occur when the transferor 
converts liquid assets to illiquid ones. 
(ii) An intention to devalue property as well as donative intent may be sug-
gested by: Gift-giving subsequent to the transfer; or the decedent's ill health 
or old age at or near the time of the act of devaluation. 
(5) The application of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following 
examples: 
Example (1). A creates an FLp, which does not function as a business, and 
transfers cash, certificates of deposit, and marketable securities to it. A is 
presumed to have the intention of devaluing his assets by converting liquid 
assets into illiquid ones. When he later transfers his partnership interest to his 
children, valuation under section 20.2031-I(b) must be determined withour 
regard to the volitional acts of valuation depression. Thus, A must value his 
cash, certificates of deposit, or marketable securities without regard to his act 
of devaluation. Thus, his partnership interest must be valued by the fair mar-
ket value of the assets he transferred to the FLP without regard to discounts 
attaching to the limited partnership form. 
Example (2). B transfers marketable securities and oil interests to her FLP. 
The working oil interests represent II % of the assets in the FLP. With respect 
to the marketable securities, B is presumed to have the intention of devaluing 
her assets by converting liquid assets into illiquid ones and must value the 
marketable securities without the discounts attaching to the limited partner-
ship form. Because the working oil interests represent assets used in a trade or 
business, they can be valued under the general fair market value definition of 
section 20.2031-1 (b) as long as transfers are "bona fide, at arm's length," and 
lack "any donative intent." If subsequent to the establishment of the FLp, B 
makes gifts of FLP interests to her children, or is 85 years old at the time of 
those transfers to the FLp, that fact may indicate that B intended to devalue 
his assets or may establish donative intent. In either event, that would require 
the oil interests to be valued at their underlying value. 
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V. Conclusion 
Fair market value is defined in the section 2031 Regulations. That definition 
of fair market value relies on for its validity the normal definitions of its sig-
nificant terms: a "seller" is someone who is seeking the highest price for her 
product and a "buyer" is someone who wants to obtain the lowest price for 
his purchase. It is only that tension that creates the realistic, and fair, market 
value of that asset. Indeed, without that conflict, the definition is comprised 
of hollow words. 
In the context of family limited partnerships, terms have been misused. By 
utilizing the limited partnership shell, liquid assets become illiquid in order 
to discount those assets and to pay less transfer tax. 
Because limited partnership interests have little, if any, influence on the 
activity of a partnership, the valuation of these interests may be significantly 
reduced by valuation discounts, such as discounts for lack of control or lack 
of marketability. Use of substantial discounts allows estates to minimize 
both the value of the reported limited partnership interest and the reported 
Federal estate or gift tax liability.172 
Moreover, if a seller wanted to maximize her selling price, she would liquidate 
the partnership and sell its assets at their full fair market values.173 Any transfer 
of her partnership interest from that standpoint should reflect the value of the 
FLPs assets.174 If the current Regulation inadequately produces that result, the 
Regulation needs to be modified so that all of an estate's assets are accurately 
valued. A significant amount of revenue is at stake.175 
The estate tax fair market value definition Regulation should be amended 
to account for situations where its assumptions do not apply and, therefore, 
results in a distortion of value. Currently, there are two income tax loss Regu-
172Eller, supra note 19, at 196. 
173Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.c. 478, 495 (2000) (Parr, J., dissenting) ("If a 
hypothetical third party had offered to purchase the assets held by the partnership for the full 
fair market value of those assets, there is little doubt that decedent could have had the assets 
distributed to himself to complete the sale."). 
174See id. at 491 (majority op.) ("Approximately 75[%) of the pattnership's value consisted 
of cash and securities. It is unlikely and plainly contrary to the interests of a hypothetical seller 
to sell these interests separately and without regard to the liquidity of the underlying assets. 
SFLP was not a risky business or one in which the continuing value of the assets depended on 
continuing operations."). 
1751n 2001, although relatively few estate tax returns included limited partnerships, they 
represent over a billion dollars in revenue. Eller, supra note 19 at 192 ("For decedents who 
died in 2001, only a small fraction, l. 7%, of estates included interests in family limited part-
nerships, whether operating family businesses or mere estate-planning devices. These 1,880 
estates reported almost $l.7 billion in family limited pattnership interests"). With discounts 
averaging around 30% to 60%, that is a large revenue loss for what generally amounts to a 
slight of hand. See id. at 197. 
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lations that deal with the intentional destruction of property and they provide 
instruction for the drafting of an exception to the fair market definition in 
section 20.2031-1(b). The proposed Regulation should provide that where, 
prior to the valuation date, a transferor (donor or decedent) willfully acts to 
diminish the value of his property, the property's value must be determined 
without reference to those actions. Further, where a donor/decedent creates 
an entity such as a family limited partnership and transfers liquid assets such 
as cash, cash equivalents, or marketable securities, she will be presumed to 
be acting willfully primarily to reduce the value of her estate. Unless she can 
prove that those assets were ordinary and necessary for the operation of her 
business, their value as part of an entity interest will be ignored and they must 
be valued in their pre-diminished, liquid form. 
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